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OLD AND NEW ACTORS IN THE ITALIAN DRUG TRADE:
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ABSTRACT. The article analyses Italian and foreign organized crime involved in the drug
market from two perspectives. The first, called “criminal succession”, assumes that the great
presence of foreign criminal groups into this illegal market would represent a menace to
the traditional hegemony exercised by Mafia-type associations in Italy. From a different
perspective, defined as “functional specialisation”, the involvement of foreign criminal
groups in the drug market could also be seen in terms of criminal “labour force” tending to
follow the same mechanisms occurring in the general market at large, where immigrants fill
low-paying jobs not requested by the local population. Through the analysis of data provided
by the Italian Central Antidrug Bureau and recent court records the article tests these two
perspectives. In particular, the in-depth analysis of three case studies from northern, central
and southern Italy – i.e. Milan, Florence and Naples – has allowed us to identify the main
changes that occurred in the drug market since the early 1990s. In effect, in Milan and
Florence, we register the emergence of foreign criminal actors in the high- and medium-
level positions of the local drug trade, while in Naples, where Camorra clans hold very
strong positions, it leaves small areas of autonomy to foreign criminal groups.
KEY WORDS: criminal opportunities, foreign criminal groups, kinship, Mafia-type
associations, organization, violence
INTRODUCTION
For some years now, Italian law enforcement agencies have increasingly
focused their attention on organized crime from foreign sources. Although
official Italian Interior Ministry reports in the mid-1990s on the “state of
organized crime” assigned only a secondary place to the problem, the grow-
ing importance of foreign criminal activity now leads it to occupy entire
sections and chapters of these annual reports. In addition, criminal statistics
since the early 1990s have shown significant involvement of foreigners in
various types of organized crime.
This article concentrates on drug trafficking and sales. Based on the
information from the Direzione Centrale Servizi Antidroga (Central An-
tidrug Bureau) and analysis of recent court records, changes in the drug
trade have been outlined from the point of view of supply: the permanence
of old criminal actors as well as new arrivals on the criminal scene. Finally,
the study of three Italian cities – Milan, Florence and Naples – as case
studies in northern, central and southern Italy will help show the different
criminal positions held by foreigners in the local drug market.
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Questions
The undeniable presence of foreigners in the drug trade leads to several
basic questions. As the Italian context is characterized by the “historical”
presence of traditional organizations such as the Cosa Nostra, Camorra,
‘Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita, it should be asked whether or not the
appearance of foreign organizations in the Italian underworld represents a
threat to the traditional hegemony exercised by indigenous criminal groups
or if it presages a real change in the hierarchical order to the advantage
of groups from abroad. If this hypothesis can be verified then we find
ourselves facing a process of change that could be defined in terms of
“ethnic succession” in criminal activities.
But the involvement of foreign groups in major illegal markets can also
be seen from a very different point of view: i.e., as a social-type contri-
bution, in terms of a criminal “labour force” following the same logic and
mechanisms that occur in the general labour market where immigrants
fill low-paying jobs, disdained by the local population as undesirable and
lacking in value. In this sense, foreign groups would take on secondary
roles and tasks, functionally subordinate with respect to the indigenous
organizations still firmly in control of major international trafficking. In
this case, the internal balance of the Italian criminal landscape, although
characterized by the presence of foreign groups, would nevertheless seem
to remain unchanged.
Criminal Succession
The succession of criminal groups of different national origin has its refer-
ence point in the theory of “anomie” developed by Robert Merton (1957),
a theory that has been frequently corroborated in American sociological
literature. Based on the supposition that legal opportunities for advance-
ment up the social ladder are blocked for immigrant populations because of
discrimination, entrance into criminal activity is nothing more than an al-
ternative to institutionally legitimate systems to acquire a better social con-
dition. Once a certain status and comfortable social condition are reached,
the immigrant community would tend to abandon the criminal environment
and turn to legal activities instead. In this phase, the main aspiration would
consist in overcoming the lifestyle and modus operandi typical of gangsters
or professional criminals in order to begin a process of legitimisation and
integration in line with models and criteria of values present in the greater
society at large.
Various scholars have noted this type of phenomenon involving immi-
grant communities established in the United States in the early decades of
the 20th century. Daniel Bell (1960) had no hesitation in calling crime a sort
of “queer ladder” of social mobility. But it was Francis Ianni (1974) who
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systematically developed the theoretical framework centred on the pro-
cess of ethnic succession. In his analysis of the American underworld,
he pointed out the progressive alternation of various criminal groups,
differentiated by national origin, in illegal businesses such as drug traf-
ficking and gambling. Although African-Americans managed these mar-
kets earlier in the 1940s, they were replaced by groups of Italian origin
that were in turn gradually replaced, during the 1970s, by Cubans and
Puerto Ricans.
Forms of ethnic succession characterizing the underworld tend to show
themselves in terms of a framework based on “cyclical movement” related,
on the one hand, to the process of integration into the host society of
long established foreign communities and, on the other, to the arrival of
new communities. First and foremost, immigrant communities involved
in criminal activities redirect themselves toward legality parallel to the
progressive recognition and legitimacy acquired in society at large. As the
ethnic group overcomes a series of discriminatory socio-political barriers,
its members tend to focus their attention on institutional ways and means
designed to reach better positions on the social ladder. Tangible signs of this
process of legitimisation in American society are found, for instance, in the
possibility that police chiefs, judges and political representatives at various
levels are chosen from members of their communities. But secondly, as
there is no decrease in the demand for illegal good and services, new
criminal actors come on the scene, filling the void left by the ethnic group
present for a longer period in the new country. In this case, new groups from
more recent immigrant communities quickly fill the space left by previous
criminal groups.
Although this is, in broad terms, our theoretical reference point, we
should nevertheless keep in mind that it can only partially be considered in
the analysis of the Italian criminal context. The immigration phenomenon
affecting Italy goes back only a few decades while the United States could
be considered, from this point of view, a society that originated and grew
thanks to the continuous arrival of foreign populations from an extremely
wide variety of countries. The characterization in the ethnic sense of so-
cial as well as criminal phenomena – what Bell called “the warp of the
American society” (1960, p. 11) – does not have the same importance in
Italy as it has come to have in the American context. In dealing with a
relatively recent immigration phenomenon, it is impossible to find empir-
ical evidence in current data that would confirm the passage from illegal
to legal activities of specific groups of immigrants, a passage that on the
other hand seems to characterize many communities in their process of
integration into American society.
In the Italian context, it is nevertheless possible to identify the in-
volvement of foreign elements in the first phase of criminal succession,
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related to their definitive incorporation into illegal activities. And fur-
ther conclusions can be drawn from the theoretical framework out-
lined earlier, one that has proven to be a useful interpretative tool
in analysing relationships between indigenous and foreign criminal
groups.
The most important indication comes from taking into considera-
tion the organizational dynamics that mark each criminal group. As
Ianni showed, Cuban criminal groups were able to acquire supremacy
in the drug trade and illegal gambling over competitors such as African-
Americans and Puerto Ricans, thanks to the availability of extra-criminal
resources such as bonds of trust with others from their country and a sys-
tem of recruiting new members based on kinship. This modus operandi
could be seen as a sort of “natural” social capital that helped them
compensate for the intrinsic mistrust that characterizes all illegal mar-
kets, thus giving them an additional resource compared to other illegal
actors.
Therefore, we are dealing with an analysis aimed at discovering whether
or not certain foreign groups that are involved more than others in criminal
activities may have adopted an organizational structure that places them in
the condition of establishing fairly stable, long-lasting relationships, based
on reciprocal trust. Because of this structure and the use of criminal as well
as non-criminal resources, they may be able to acquire top management
positions in the drug trade.
Criminal Activity by Foreigners as Functional Specialization
Barriers to the definitive entrance of groups of foreign origin in particu-
larly profitable markets, such as drug trafficking for example, combined
with the relatively recent immigration phenomenon, make it plausible to
consider an analysis from a different perspective. This hypothesis, based
on the circumscribed and functionally specialized role of criminal activity
by foreigners, gives rise to a scenario that is noticeably different from the
previous one.
Keeping in mind the persistent power of indigenous criminal organi-
zations, foreign elements would tend to be located on the lower rungs of
the hierarchical ladder, performing jobs that, although low-level and un-
skilled, are clearly necessary if illegal operations are to be successful. In
this sense, the significant involvement of certain immigrant groups in the
drug trade should be considered; their members employed in the retail sales
of drugs. Thus street dealing, well-known to be more dangerous because of
the greater risk of identification by law enforcement, would be occupied by
groups of immigrants exploited by very large Italian traffickers, still firmly
established at the highest levels of the international drug trade. Foreign
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groups involved in criminal activities would thus have a subordinate and
secondary position within this market.
Thus, the organizational dimension and cultural background of these
foreign actors should be reconsidered. Although foreigners may create
associative-type criminal groups, they could hardly be compared to the
Mafia structures that distinguish indigenous groups either in terms of crim-
inal strength, the danger they present or their ability to firmly root them-
selves in the territory. The national origin of criminal actors should not, as a
rule, be considered a useful interpretive element in explaining why certain
groups instead of others are more involved in illegal activities. In fact, it can
even be misleading as it shifts the centre of analysis from the deeper dy-
namics running through the overall economic system to the ethno-cultural
characteristics of the actors, generating more or less stereotyped forms of
labelling and simplification, closer to popular attitudes. Rather than speak-
ing of foreign groups of an ethnic make-up, we should ask ourselves, on
the one hand, what functional necessities are required by illegal markets
and, on the other, what analogies characterize the latter with respect to
the inclusion of the immigrants in the overall economic system. The in-
volvement of foreigners in the production of illegal goods and services
should be interpreted as the mirror image of what happens in the broader
labour market. Just as immigrants present in Italy tend to perform tasks
that are poorly paid, dangerous and undesired by the local population, for-
eigners operating in the underworld hold jobs that are just as risky and
unprofitable.
Italian organized crime groups put foreigners in charge of managing drug
dealing areas, using them as unskilled criminal labour. Analogously, the sta-
tistically significant presence of foreign subjects implicated in drug-related
crimes should be attributed to their more exposed position with respect to
law enforcement agencies as well as the tendency of the local population to
report their activities. Foreigners employed on the street in a variety of ille-
gal activities are heavily exposed to the intolerance of the local population
and consequent suppression by law enforcement. Definitively speaking, the
contribution represented by foreign criminal groups could be seen in many
cases as a functional specialization determined by the demand for a criminal
“labour force” that is not satisfied by associates from indigenous organiza-
tions as they prefer directing their interests toward more profitable activi-
ties or managing illegal international trafficking from a higher, supervisory
position.
In light of new knowledge and empirical elements, both perspectives will
be compared in order to show which seems more coherent in outlining the
ongoing change in the Italian drug trade from the point of view of criminal
actors.
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ITALIAN AND FOREIGN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DRUG TRADE
Italian Mafia organizations have been involved for several decades in inter-
national drug trafficking. During the 1970s, the Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta
and Camorra definitively established themselves in the business of import-
ing large quantities of heroin. Although earlier, in the 1950s and 1960s, this
drug traffic was in the hands of French criminal groups, mostly from Cor-
sica and Marseille, in the subsequent decade the Sicilian Cosa Nostra began
managing a massive traffic in heroin toward the US market from Turkey
and the Middle East. The important position of this organization can be
traced back to their shifting to the preliminary phases of the production
process of the drug, directly importing morphine base. With direct contacts
with Turkish suppliers and the enlistment of French chemists, refining lab-
oratories were established in Sicily. In 1980, four refining laboratories were
discovered in Palermo, each capable of producing 50 kg of heroin per week
(Arlacchi 1983, p. 232).
Through the development of trans-national networks built on bonds of
trust with associates who had emigrated abroad, these organizations were
able to establish a vast international drug trafficking network. Nevertheless,
over the past few years, various important factors have intervened that may
have damaged the advantageous position acquired by these groups in the
drug trade. First, a series of law enforcement operations, brought on by the
Mafia killings in the early 1990s in which Judges Giovanni Falcone and
Paolo Borsellino lost their lives, led to the decapitation of the heads of the
Cosa Nostra both in their traditionally established areas, such as Sicily, as
well as northern-central Italy. In the second place, the arrival on the Italian
drug market of foreign groups who gradually occupied fairly important
positions in the mid-to-high as well as lower levels of the retail distribution
chain. Long-term analysis shows major changes in the relation between
the number of Italians and foreigners involved in drug crimes organized by
type of crime, as seen in Tables I and II.
The number of Italians involved in drug sales fell from 22,813 (1991)
to 18,774 (2002) while those accused of criminal conspiracy to traffic in-
creased, respectively, from 1280 (1991) to 2184 (2002), and for the crime
of production and trafficking from 1587 (1991) to 2347 (2002). On the
other hand, foreigners accused of drug sales increased from 4238 (1991) to
7371 (2002). The frequently presented hypothesis that foreigners may have
substituted Italians in retail distribution is somewhat confirmed from this
point of view. Furthermore, the foreign component grows just as signifi-
cantly for other types of crimes (production and trafficking, conspiracy to
traffic). This fact leads us to believe that the substitution of Italians by for-
eigners in the lower levels of the distribution network is in reality just one
of the changes the Italian drug market is experiencing. On the other hand,
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TABLE I
Italians investigated for “production and trafficking”, “sale”, “conspiracy to traffic”,a “other
crimes under the law” (1991–2002).
Production Conspiracy Other Total
Year and trafficking Sale to traffic crimes Italians
1991 1587 22,813 1280 60 25,740
1992 2488 27,644 2512 146 32,810
1993 2613 21,596 2288 203 26,700
1994 3335 21,567 2946 149 27,997
1995 2771 19,704 2333 183 25,174
1996 2699 20,223 2603 80 25,605
1997 2130 19,293 2273 27 23,723
1998 2132 18,214 2435 10 22,791
1999 2475 19,875 1949 36 24,335
2000 2652 19,461 2315 36 24,464
2001 2409 18,923 2227 27 23,586
2002 2347 18,774 2184 12 23,317
aCurrent Italian law (l. 309/1990) defines conspiracy as occurring whenever at least three
persons are involved in the same crime and there is a link between them to help conduct the
illegal activity.
TABLE II
Foreigners investigated for “production and trafficking”, “sale”,a “conspiracy to traffic”
and “other crimes under the law” (1991–2002).
Production Conspiracy Other Total
Year and trafficking Sale traffic crimes foreigners
1991 593 4238 168 17 5022
1992 721 4646 206 1 5574
1993 557 5656 143 87 6443
1994 600 7334 193 1 8128
1995 685 6524 268 1 7478
1996 955 6046 377 2 7380
1997 1271 7437 560 9268
1998 1325 8745 506 10,576
1999 1439 8244 377 1 10,061
2000 1734 7723 438 2 9897
2001 1844 8120 581 10,545
2002 1954 7371 531 1 9857
aFrom 1998 to 2002, the column related to “sale” also includes “conspiracy to sale” (in all
years considered, this category does not reach more than 1% of total crimes committed by
Italians and foreigners).
Source: 1991–1997, M. Barbagli, Immigrazione e reati in Italia, 2002, p. 77; for other
years, personal calculations based on data from the Direzione Centrale Servizi Antidroga,
2003.
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the significant presence of foreigners in organized traffic also indicates the
existence of criminal networks capable of managing the introduction and
commercialisation of drugs, either in agreement with Italian organizations
or, alternatively, virtually autonomous from them. The presence of foreign-
ers in the mid-to-top levels of the business would lead us to believe they
are themselves capable of organizing the distribution chain from the import
phase to retail sales.
The drug market presents an inflexible structure for illegal opportunities,
a structure that only rarely permits those in lower levels to occupy higher
positions. The segmentation of the market, connected to asymmetries in
information available to the different illegal actors, and entrance barriers,
made up of the use of violence and the availability of capital, represent
obstacles that increase as one gets closer to the top of the distribution
hierarchy (Lepri 1993, p. 348). In this sense, it would be very difficult for
those performing “worker” functions, such as street dealing, to have the
chance to hold more profitable positions.
The processes of upward mobility to the advantage of new illegal actors
can be explained by mentioning two, frequently connected, major con-
ditions: law enforcement operations that overthrow previously dominant
criminal networks, and factors intrinsic to emerging criminal groups related
to their own internal cohesion and the availability of limited resources such
as the use of violence. Those who have obtained sufficient internal cohe-
sion and a certain criminal clout find themselves in the position of imposing
respect on other competitors, thus acquiring a high-ranking position in the
management of illegal trafficking. On the other hand, those groups char-
acterized by a lack of internal cohesion and meagre criminal resources
find themselves performing secondary functions with a high risk of being
identified by law enforcement.
In fact, if we cross-reference the different types of crime examined pre-
viously with the foreign nationalities most involved, several interesting
aspects emerge. Tables III–V show a sort of “ethnic” stratification corre-
sponding to the different position each national group occupies within the
distribution hierarchy of the drug trade.
Foreigners from Northern Africa are particularly exposed to law enforce-
ment operations, as they mainly occupy lower levels in the distribution net-
work. Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians are almost exclusively involved
in street dealing activities. On the other hand, these same national groups
are barely present in crimes indicating the existence of organizations such
as large-scale drug trafficking and conspiracy to traffic. The same holds
true for the French and Spanish.
Although less present in terms of absolute values, other nationalities
show a notably different situation. Colombians are particularly involved in
trafficking (2000), so much so that this criminal charge concerns almost
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TABLE III
The top 10 nationalities organized by type of crime (production and trafficking, sales,a
conspiracy to traffic (2000)).
Production Conspiracy
Nationality and trafficking % Sales % to traffic % Total
Morocco 393 13 2622 86 46 2 3063
Tunisia 97 6 1512 93 20 1 1629
Algeria 35 3 1068 96 4 0 1107
Albania 430 46 317 34 184 20 931
Nigeria 104 29 217 60 42 12 363
Colombia 190 83 22 10 17 7 229
Senegal 17 8 200 89 7 3 224
France 10 5 177 92 4 2 192
Spain 17 9 167 88 5 3 189
Ghana 26 25 79 75 1 1 106
aConspiracy to sell, corresponding to 0% in 2000 and values between 1 and 2% in other
years has been included in the “sales” category. Since it shows even lower percentage values,
the category “other crimes under the law” has been eliminated.
Source: Personal calculations based on data from the Direzione Centrale Servizi Antidroga
(2000).
TABLE IV
The top 10 nationalities organized by type of crime (production and trafficking, sales and
conspiracy to traffic (2001)).
Production Conspiracy
Nationality and trafficking % Sales % to traffic % Total
Morocco 332 10 2820 86 121 4 3273
Tunisia 128 9 1328 90 24 2 1480
Albania 577 46 422 33 268 21 1267
Algeria 37 3 1134 96 13 1 1184
Nigeria 166 42 221 55 13 3 400
Spain 25 7 324 91 6 2 355
France 15 7 176 87 12 6 203
Senegal 21 10 179 89 1 0 201
Palestine 2 1 132 99 0 134
Former 34 29 69 58 15 13 118
Yugoslavia
Source: Personal calculations based on data from the Direzione Centrale Servizi Antidroga
(2001).
266 STEFANO BECUCCI
TABLE V
Top 10 nationalities organized by type of crime (production and trafficking, sales and
conspiracy to traffic (2002)).
Production Conspiracy
Nationality and trafficking % Sales % to traffic % Total
Morocco 430 14 2478 83 79 3 2987
Tunisia 154 11 1181 87 20 1 1355
Albania 567 45 485 39 202 16 1254
Algeria 53 6 903 94 2 0 958
Spain 18 5 353 93 10 3 381
Nigeria 138 38 226 62 0 364
France 10 5 171 93 2 1 184
Former 45 25 75 41 61 34 181
Yugoslavia
Senegal 13 7 163 92 1 1 177
Palestine 3 2 119 98 0 122
Source: Personal calculations based on data from the Direzione Centrale Servizi Antidroga
(2002).
all foreigners of this nationality. However, they have comparatively lower
values for the crime of conspiracy to traffic, probably a sign that many of
them are intercepted alone at the border with the intention of bringing drugs
into Italy. Albanians, Nigerians and immigrants from the former Yugoslavia
show a significant presence in conspiracy-type crimes. These groups are
more involved in trafficking and conspiracy-type crimes than retail sales,
and occupy an important position at the mid-to-high level of the drug trade.
Established Mafia Presence in Milan and
its Greater Metropolitan Area
With its intense financial and commercial activity, the city of Milan has long
exercised a great attraction for Italian organized crime groups. A series of
related factors helped the first Mafia groups establish themselves there
in the 1960s, in a territory that had been immune to particularly serious
criminal phenomena until then.
The ease of camouflage within the largest-ever flow of immigrants
from southern Italy to the north in search of work and the substantial
underestimation of a phenomenon believed to be confined to its original
areas allowed Mafia families to operate for many years in relative security
and impunity; and we should also recall the unintentional contribution
made by the numerous judicial measures from 1965 that required convicted
Mafia members to reside outside their region of origin. Instead of severing
connections with their areas of origin, the use of compulsory residence as a
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prevention measure in reality helped expand criminal networks into north-
ern Italy to the advantage of the various Mafia groups (Massari, 2001, p. 12).
Mafia presence in the Milan area was marked by several fundamental
steps, corresponding to the phases of emergence, expansion and estab-
lishment in the territory. At first, the Mafia nuclei dedicated themselves
to predatory-type activities such as employment rackets (exploiting the
workforce from southern Italy), kidnapping for extortion, and robbery.
From 1973–1974 to the mid-1980s, the statements of several pentiti (Mafia
members turned witnesses for the state) showed groups from Calabria
were mainly involved in robbery and kidnapping (Tribunale Milano
1997c, p. 276).
In a second phase, having acquired certain economic wealth, each of
these Mafia associations started up its own contacts with foreign drug
suppliers. Connections were made based either on more or less casual
acquaintances made in prison or already established criminal networks
such as, for example, those involved in cigarette smuggling (Tribunale
Milano 1997a).
Both major and minor criminal groups tend to simultaneously activate
many contacts with different suppliers in order to greater increase their busi-
ness volume. In an extremely dynamic criminal context, the trend toward
establishing potentially stable relationships with foreign suppliers is always
associated with the opening of new lines of importation.
Drug trafficking reached a steady intensity around the beginning of the
1980s, concurrent with the installation of several laboratories for refining
morphine base in the periphery of Milan. Members of gangs from Calabria
managed around 150 kg per month of heroin and cocaine with individual
profits ranging from 100 to 200 million Italian lire (50,000–100,000 euros)
per month (Tribunale Milano 1997b, p. 869). The hierarchical structure
of the distribution network and considerable volume of drugs trafficked
meant Mafia families tended to control a broad section of the distribution
network, in some cases down to organizing and directing street dealers.
Under the control of organization associates, drug dealers had to respect
their own “shifts” in order to guarantee a constant presence in areas where
retail sales were made (Tribunale Milano 1994, pp. 32–33).
The phase of integration into general society began expanding in the mid-
1980s. Creating construction and earthmoving firms, and buying real es-
tate agencies and other commercial activities helped launder illegal profits.
Mafia firms apparently performing legal activities served as logistical sup-
port for drug trafficking. Meetings to decide the cost of heroin consignments
were held with buyers in bars run by members of criminal groups. Delivery
was then entrusted to young people who received a salary of about 1500 eu-
ros a month from the trafficking organization. These “kids” moved around
10 kg of heroin per month and performed the most dangerous duties related
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to selling drugs and collecting money from customers with sales prices set
by the bosses. Although at first they perform “manual” criminal labour,
the elements gravitating around criminal associations – a large percentage
of them from the same regions as the associates – are socialized on Mafia
models. So gangs have the chance to later select those among these workers
considered the most valid and trustworthy from a criminal standpoint.
The power of Mafia groups lay in their ability to manage considerable
criminal, economic and political resources. When needed, they had a large
quantity of new recruits available to be drafted on site or from their ter-
ritories of origin. They also benefited from the support of a vast network
of accomplices and collaborators who, although not associates, guaranteed
easy solutions to logistical and organizational problems related to managing
illegal trafficking. When, for example, safe places had to be found where
they could freely communicate without worrying about being overheard
by strangers or when it was necessary to resort to cooperative front men
to hide their earnings, Mafia organizations found support within the circle
of people from their own regions and political collusion with various local
city administrations in the greater metropolitan area of Milan (Tribunale
Milano 1997c).
In the early 1990s, when criminal groups had most firmly rooted them-
selves in the area, a process of growing integration along commercial lines
took place between the various Mafia structures. Top-level representatives
from several organizations, each with their own share, participated in fi-
nancing drug shipments that were then divided up according to spheres
of territorial influence. The case of the Car Park in Via Salamone, run by
a member of the Cursoti clan from Catania, symbolically represents the
level of integration between groups from Sicily, Calabria and Campania. A
parking lot built next to the Milan Fruit and Vegetable Market was actually
a fictitious economic activity established as a front for the wholesale supply
centre for heroin, cocaine and hashish for the major criminal organizations
present in the area.1
Recent Changes in the Milan Drug Trade
On examining major court proceedings regarding criminal activity from
the early 1990s, the very small presence of foreigners out of the total num-
ber of defendants is immediately evident. Compared to the involvement
of several hundred members of Mafia associations, the role of foreigners
is of secondary importance not only from a quantitative point of view but
probably also in a qualitative sense. If at first Italian consortia were based
1A 1992 search of the Car Park in Via Salamone uncovered 17 pump shotguns, two
sub-machine guns, a sawed-off shotgun, and five pistols along with more than a thousand
cartridges, about 140 kg of hashish and 5 kg of heroin.
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on connections with suppliers through foreign intermediaries present in
Italy, later, when the market was well established, Italian organizations
themselves established direct contacts with foreign producers. Mafia heads
went to South American countries, Turkey or the Middle East with the aim
of negotiating commercial agreements with producers (Tribunale Milano
1997a, p. 1500). The role of foreigners involved in judicial investigations
from the early 1990s could be substantially traced back to two categories:
they acted either as couriers for foreign suppliers or, if necessary, intermedi-
aries between Mafia groups and Turkish or South American organizations.
Regardless of their degree of connection to foreign organizations, they
acted on the local market as individuals rather than components of groups
operating on site. As they were mainly involved in large-scale international
trafficking, they had little presence in mid-to-low levels of the distribution
network. In fact, for low-level jobs, Mafia associations almost exclusively
used Italian drug dealers and courier “mules”.
Since the mid-1990s, the drug trade in Milan, as in other cities in central
northern Italy, has shown a significant involvement of foreigners in both
retail distribution as well as the management of international trafficking.
A qualitative examination of recent judicial files closed in early 2000
shows how the local criminal context has changed significantly compared
to the previous period. First of all, couriers and emissaries from Turkish
criminal families seem to have substantially disappeared from the market.2
Their place has been quickly taken over by importers and intermediaries
from Eastern Europe, particularly Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. Acting as
go-betweens for Italian traffickers and foreign producers, they manage the
most consistent flows of heroin on the scene. Foreign groups involved in
importing hold a high position in the distribution network. Although they
sell consignments of drugs both to foreign as well as Italian traffickers,
the latter make up the principal contact for the most organized importers
because of their outstanding operational capability and large amounts of
available capital.
The scenario outlined earlier shows the succession of different national-
ities in the roles of drug traffickers – from Turkish couriers and middlemen
to Eastern European importers – and distributors – from mid-level Italian
dealers recruited from Mafia gangs to foreign salesmen. But what factors
have determined these changes? They seem to originate from the effect of
two main convergent factors. On the one hand, effective law enforcement
operations against Italian organizations and, on the other, the arrival on the
scene in Milan of new actors able to provide illegal goods and services on
an international scale.
2 Interview with a magistrate from the Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia in Milan, 3
February 2003.
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Since the early 1990s, numerous operations by judicial authorities have
involved several thousand affiliates of southern Italian organizations op-
erating in Milan and the greater metropolitan area.3 Major organizations
from Calabria, Sicily and Campania suffered greatly from these operations
that eliminated their top management and consistently dismantled networks
of associates.4 One indicator of the diminished criminal capacity of these
southern Italian groups can be seen in the significant reduction in Mafia
homicides in Milan over the past few years. From 1996 to 2000, only one
homicide can be traced back to activities of the Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta
or Camorra.5
The opening up of space for new criminal groups, unthinkable a few
years ago, has not indiscriminately favoured new foreign actors but only
those able to easily exploit these new opportunities thanks to greater orga-
nizational skills and trans-national connections. Since the fall of the Soviet
regime, Balkan countries have become a nerve centre for large-scale ille-
gal trafficking. Criminal organizations from this region have become a link
between Turkey, the Middle East and Western Europe for drug traffick-
ing (Strazzari and Dognini, 2000, p. 32). By acting as “service agencies”
for a variety of buyers, criminal groups formed by Albanians and former
Yugoslavs have been able to “intercept” the most profitable trafficking ac-
tivities directed toward Italy to their own advantage.
ORGANIZED CRIME IN FLORENCE
The initial Mafia phenomenon started in the 1960s and was connected to
the large number of court-ordered changes of residence that brought several
Mafia bosses to various Tuscan Provinces. The areas most involved were:
Florence, Prato and various smaller cities in the greater metropolitan area
of Florence (Massari 1998, p. 32). Top-level Cosa Nostra bosses such as
Gaspare Mutolo, Leonardo Messina and Giuseppe Madonia initially acted
as “privileged observers” for the planning of illegal projects and the creation
of new criminal networks (Minna 1993, p. 29).
Although certain aspects of the Mafia presence in Tuscany show analo-
gous methods to those seen in Milan, there are also significant differences.
While the transferral of Mafia groups to other regions in northern Italy
3From 1990 to 1999, several police operations led to the arrest of almost 3000 people, to
large extent members of Mafia-type organizations (L’Europeo 1994, p. 27; Omicron 2001,
pp. 184–185).
4These judicial operations broke up the internal chain of command of the Italian Mafia
organizations, compromising, at times irreversibly, financial relationships established by
bosses with foreign producers.
5Annuario Giudiziario, Delitti denunciati all’Autorita` Giudiziaria dalla Polizia di Stato,
dall’Arma dei Carabinieri e dal Corpo della Guardia di Finanza, ISTAT (1996–2000).
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follows an evolutionary process summarized in the three phases of emer-
gence, expansion and establishment in the territory, in Tuscany the criminal
phenomenon tended to take on different connotations. Here there seem to
be neither forms of real territorial control nor infiltration of local politics
as, instead, has taken place in other cities in Lombardy and Piedmont.6
In the early 1990s, elements of the Musumeci clan carried out extortion
attempts in several areas of Tuscany, such as Versilia, near Viareggio and
Torre del Lago, and became involved in illegal gambling. However, major
judicial operations during that period, along with the presence of a firmly
established local democratic tradition and the willingness of the population
to collaborate with law enforcement, kept Mafia associations from being
successful in establishing themselves or their control over the area. But
Tuscany still holds an important position because it offers opportunities,
especially in major tourist areas, for laundering illegal profits. Instead of
being subjected to actual Mafia settlement, the Tuscan area has become first
and foremost a sort of “washing machine” for illegal profits (Commissione
Parlamentare 1994, p. 206).7
According to magistrates from the Public Prosecutor’s Office, criminal
phenomena traceable to Mafia organizations from southern Italy go back to
the mid-1990s in the metropolitan area of Florence. With the exception of
the Mafia terrorist attacks on the Uffizi in 1993, part of a mass destruction
strategy adopted by the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, there have been no crimi-
nal events that could be attributed to Mafia associations.8 Since several
celebrated trials in Florence in the early 1990s, no further judicial inves-
tigations have been held of Mafia elements.9 Statistical indicators such as
Mafia homicides and dynamite attacks agree with evaluations submitted
by investigating bodies. Between 1996 and 2000, no Mafia-type homi-
cides took place that could be traced back to the Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta
or Camorra. Dynamite and/or incendiary attacks also show very modest
numbers: a total of 18 between 1996 and 2000.10
6 The city council of Bardonecchia, a ski resort in Val di Susa, was disbanded in April
1995, because of Mafia infiltration (Caselli 2003, p. 2).
7In June 2003, the Prosecutor’s Office of Palermo ordered the seizure of a large country
estate, purchased through a front by several Mafia families from Palermo, in the town of
Montespertoli, 15 km from Florence.
8The attack on the Uffizi was carried with the participation of Vicenzo Ferro, a “Mafioso”
from Alcamo (a town in the province of Trapani in Sicily), who had asked one of his relatives
living in Florence to loan him his apartment as a logistical base for the Mafia group being
transferred from Sicily (Chiari 1997).
9 Interview with two magistrates from the Florence Public Prosecutor’s Office, 2 June
2003.
10Annuario Giudiziario, Delitti denunciati all’Autorita` Giudiziaria dalla Polizia di Stato,
dall’Arma dei Carabinieri e dal Corpo della Guardia di Finanza, ISTAT (1996–2000).
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The Drug Trade and Foreign Criminal Activity in Florence
A series of variously structured foreign and Italian groups are present on
the local drug scene. The peculiarity here, compared to other cities exam-
ined, lies in the fact that these structures seem to have no relationships
with Mafia groups from traditional areas. With the exception of Neapolitan
elements present in the trade until several years ago, no presence of Mafia-
type associations has been registered. From this point of view, criminal
organizations operating in the drug sector are free from dealing with more
structured criminal organizations capable of exercising pervasive and total
control over the underworld.
A series of aspects generally characterizes the drug trade in the area of
Florence. Actors involved in legal proceedings regarding importation and
bulk sales were almost all foreigners. Among these, Albanians occupy a
dominant position in the local market. Other groups of foreigners from
North African countries tend to work in mid-level distribution.11 Italians
now act as drug couriers from one Italian city to another and are involved
in retail sales to select clienteles.
Some criminal groups composed of foreigners have been able to reach
important positions in virtue of the fact there are no entrance barriers to
the local market from a criminal point of view. The substantial absence of
Mafia-type criminal activity in this market has left foreign traffickers with
room to manoeuvre that would be extremely difficult to obtain in other con-
texts. Foreign traffickers have not had to deal with “cumbersome” criminal
intermediaries unwilling to accept competitors operating at a similar level
in the same market.
ORGANIZED CRIME IN NAPLES AND THE GREATER METROPOLITAN AREA
Around 100 different Camorra “clans” involving thousands of members
are found in the province of Naples (DDA 2002). The extremely broad and
well-defined criminal activities of these organizations include extortion,
loan-sharking, illegal gambling, cigarette smuggling, drug trafficking and
even investment in the legal economy.
These clans exercise nearly total control over their areas of influence. In
provincial towns like Torre Annunziata, Pompei, Torre del Greco, Ercolano
and various neighbourhoods in Naples, protection rackets are so widespread
that “all economic activities, even small ones, must submit to extortion”
(DDA 2002, p. 11).
Although the numerous judicial operations in the early 1990s, instigated
by the collaboration of several charismatic Camorra leaders, threw many
11 Interview with a magistrate from the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Florence, 4 June
2003.
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clans into disarray, their influence over the surrounding social fabric was
only temporarily diminished. A 1997 report from the Public Prosecutor’s
Office in Naples to the Anti-Mafia Commission indicated there had been,
over the previous three years, “a dramatic increase in homicides and at-
tempted homicides due to the need to establish new arrangements between
the various organizations now deprived of strong central points of reference;
and in new recruits who, guns in hand, have forced their way into positions
left empty by those arrested; and the progressive expansion of ‘fugitives’
and elusive ‘historical fugitives’ (. . .) and their organizations into territories
no longer adequately ‘governed”’ (cit. in Barbagallo 1999, p. 182). Once
organization heads were incarcerated, an internal power struggle began be-
tween those who, up till that point, had only held secondary positions. The
disarray suffered by criminal organizations favoured the emergence of new
groups in a mechanism of continuous re-ordering of previous alliances,
producing new divisions in spheres of territorial influence. For instance,
some areas of the city characterized by the historical presence of particular
crime families, such as the Giuliano family in the Forcella neighbourhood,
have seen neighbouring clans move in and establish their own control as a
result of law enforcement operations.
Contrary to occurrences in other traditional Mafia areas, where damage
incurred from law enforcement activities has led some criminal organiza-
tions, such as the Cosa Nostra, to significantly change their strategy, internal
conflicts within the various clans in Campania have been constant over the
last few years. While, after the terrorism of the early 1990s,12 the Sicilian
Mafia adopted a “lay low” strategy characterized by a low profile and lim-
ited use of violence, the Camorra is continually split by internal warfare
connected to the conquest of power and control of criminal activities. Proof
of this is seen in the number of homicides involving associates of local clans
between 1996 and 2000 in the province of Naples compared to other south-
ern Italian cities, such as Palermo and Reggio Calabria, also characterized
by the traditional presence of Mafia-type organizations (Table VI).
As opposed to the Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta, the Camorra represents
a sort of gangster-type urban Mafia phenomenon characterized by horizon-
tal structures, unwilling to accept ruling bodies established to regulate the
use of violence, sanction respect for “rules” and decide political and crimi-
nal strategies for the entire “population” of associates. Various attempts to
reproduce the unified model of other indigenous Mafia-type organizations
have systematically failed.
Operations by the courts, although capable of inflicting severe damage
on the various clans, have never actually been able to eliminate the cultural
12 The terrorist-style attacks in Milan, Florence and Rome occurred the year after the
murders of Judges Falcone and Borsellino in the summer of 1992.
274 STEFANO BECUCCI
TABLE VI
Mafia homicides in Naples, Palermo and Reggio Calabria (1996–2000).
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Naples 73 82 88 47 58 348
Palermo 10 5 5 7 3 30
Reggio Calabria 20 26 17 16 2 81
Source: Annuario Giudiziario, Delitti denunciati all’Autorita` Giudiziaria dalla Polizia di
Stato, dall’Arma dei Carabinieri e dal Corpo della Guardia di Finanza, ISTAT.
“stew” on which they feed. The widespread omerta` existing in various areas
of the city of Naples, close ties with the economy and local politics, and their
incredible ability to recruit new associates from socially marginal areas all
make the Camorra one of the toughest and most dangerous organizations
on the Italian criminal scene.13
Criminal Actors and the Drug Trade in Naples
Almost all the clans operating in the province of Naples have been involved
in drug trafficking since the end of the 1970s. Groups initially involved in
smuggling cigarettes from the Balkans have subsequently revised their
know-how and reworked their criminal networks for drug trafficking. Fur-
thermore, they have for several years now opened up direct channels for
importing massive quantities of cocaine from South America via contain-
ers. Contrary to what usually happens in other areas of the country, clans
involved in the drug market also tend to control the retail market by en-
listing low-level criminal labour. Judicial evidence of this was collected in
the area of Torre Annunziata and Ercolano, two populous centres in the
greater Neapolitan area. In 2001, a violent clash in Ercolano between dif-
ferent clans over the management of retail drug distribution led to dozens
of attacks and numerous homicides (DDA 2002, pp. 51, 68). Testimonies
collected in the field confirmed the determination of local organized crime
to extend its control not only over large trafficking operations but also street
dealing.
One street dealer from a town in the greater metropolitan area of Naples
refers to the sales system of which he is a part (Ferrillo, M., Spacciatore o
spacciato? Torino: Gruppo Abele (unpublished 2000, p. 39):
13In 2001 alone, four city government councils in the province of Naples were ordered
dissolved by the Chief Magistrate because of Mafia infiltration: Pompei, San Gennaro
Vesuviano, Santa Maria la Carita` and Pignataro Maggiore (DDA 2002, p. 111).
OLD AND NEW ACTORS IN THE ITALIAN DRUG TRADE 275
In Ponticelli, where a big retail market exists, street dealers are called to meet in a large
apartment where drugs are distributed along with instructions. Everybody is assigned a
precise spot to stand and somebody warns the dealer right away in case of danger when
the police are on the way.
The drug trade in Naples differs in several important aspects from those
in Milan and Florence. First, local organized crime presence, divided into
spheres of influence, maintains near total control over large trafficking
operations. The long arm of these groups extends down to the retail level
for which local criminal elements are recruited. In contrast to principal
theories on the structure of drug markets based on the assumption that
organized crime would have little desire to also control street dealing as
costs would be greater than benefits (Arlacchi 1988, pp. 69–75; Ruggiero
1992, p. 194; Lepri 1993, p. 348), the tight control exercised by Camorra
clans over street dealers is probably part of a wider strategy designed to
produce, on the one hand, forms of social consent and, on the other, a kind
of criminal conditioning. Along with protection rackets and political vote
tampering, the control of drug dealing represents one of the tangible signs
of a clan’s dominance over their own territory. Direct management of drug
dealers also creates an efficient distribution system and generally responds
to a precise system of territorial borders with other clans.
The widespread social tolerance toward broad illegal sectors existing in
various city neighbourhoods makes the identification of a clear line between
legal and illegal more difficult from this standpoint. Drug sales, cigarette
smuggling and the flourishing counterfeit consumer goods industry either
directly or indirectly support a large share of the local population, equivalent
to several thousand people.
During field research, we became aware of a series of facts that show the
existence of a social climate reluctant to discourage forms of illegality. For
instance, the elderly woman who sells smuggled cigarettes in her apartment
may also supply hashish to consumers in the neighbourhood, or the owners
of vacation houses along the Neapolitan Riviera may be forced to pay imag-
inary private “security guards” for protection from theft and vandalism. As
these guards are often members of Camorra clans, these houses can be
used, during the winter season, as hideouts for fugitive gangsters. A prose-
cutor from the Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia in Naples reported another
case that symbolizes the powerful conditioning exercised by the Camorra
over the social fabric. A florist with a kiosk near the court house in Naples
decided to report to the local magistrate the pressure he had suffered from
several camorristi who forced him to buy a certain amount of flowers at in-
creased prices every week. The magistrate began the investigation and the
florist was called to testify regarding his report. Having received repeated
threats in the meantime, he declared he had never received any requests for
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extortion from the camorristi. Before the public prosecutor could accuse
him of false testimony and aiding and abetting the defendants, lawyers for
the camorristi went to work to keep the florist from going on trial. So the
florist confirmed his accusations only after having been assured by these
lawyers their clients would carry out no retaliation against him. Addressing
the public prosecutor in private, the lawyers explained the motivation for
their behaviour in the following terms: “This florist is kind of an ‘institu-
tion’ for us. We buy flowers from him every Sunday. We just could not let
him have any problems with the law.”14
Relationships Between Italian and Foreign Organized
Crime in Naples
As local criminal gangs are so powerfully rooted and tend to be pervasive
in this area, what room for activity could possibly be left for foreign dealers
and traffickers?
In this sense, the case in Naples is very different from those previously
examined in Milan and Florence. First, the arrival on the scene of new
foreign criminal actors is not helped by law enforcement operations as it is in
Milan. Although operations by the Public Prosecutor open up new room for
activity, either this space is quickly filled by gangs not under investigation
at the moment or bitter internal warfare starts up for supremacy between
members of the same gang.
Recently, the presence of foreign criminal groups involved in the drug
business has emerged in sections of the greater metropolitan area and along
the coast between Naples and Salerno. According to the Direzione Distret-
tuale Antimafia, over the past few years there has been “a new phenomenon;
in many cases the retail drug dealing phase is entrusted by clans to non-
European immigrants, mostly Albanians and North Africans, who require
less pay for their activities and so allow these organizations to put drugs
on the market at significantly lower prices than in other areas, attracting
buyers from other provinces as well” (DDA 2002, p. 85). Some foreign
organizations, particularly from Albania, North Africa and Nigeria, have
actually risen from the role of subordinate dealers to managers of their own
trafficking operations.
Although the Casalesi clan, operating along the coast between Naples
and Salerno, had since the 1980s firmly opposed the presence of non-
European immigrants who moved to the area as seasonal agricultural labour,
lately it has changed its attitude. The many fires set at immigrant shelters
by the Casalesi between 1985 and 1990 and the increase in street crime
14 Interview with a Prosecutor from the Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, Naples, 17
February 2003.
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in the area caused many tourists to abandon their vacation homes along
the coast. This probably had a negative effect on the criminal income the
Casalesi received from “caretaking” for the vacation homes, along with
illegal hook-ups to the local water supply system, and led them to mak-
ing agreements with foreign criminal groups involved in prostitution and
drug dealing. Although at first undesired, these various foreign organiza-
tions now represented a chance for new illegal profits. According to recent
investigations, the Casalesi clan may impose monthly payments of 5000
euros each for non-European immigrants involved in prostitution and drug
dealing in the area.15
In general, Camorra groups maintain control of the local market, leav-
ing foreign organizations relatively autonomous. But even if both have
their own channels for importing cocaine from South America, Camorra
groups are distinguished by their operation ability, trusted contacts with
Columbian producers and various types of collusion with Italian authori-
ties. One group of Italians at the head of the Forcella gang organized the
transport of 512 kg of cocaine from Venezuela via container. A member
of the organization, having immigrated to Venezuela years before, acted as
intermediary between the Neapolitan buyers and South American produc-
ers. The cocaine, seized in Hamburg on orders from the Italian magistrate’s
office, was hidden inside a load of gloves. The cover consignment of gloves
had been organized by a company in Caracas that belonged to the Italian
contact abroad and sent to an import–export firm linked via front men to
members of the Forcella group. Neapolitan traffickers contributed, accord-
ing to their needs, to purchasing this large quantity of cocaine (Tribunale
Napoli 2001).
A group of Nigerian traffickers operating in the area between Naples,
Salerno and Caserta, managed a channel for importing cocaine from South
America through direct connections with Colombian producers or middle-
men, bringing in little more than 1 kg at a time via air couriers of various
nationalities. Once in Caserta, drugs were then distributed through inter-
nal channels to a circuit of their countrymen operating in several cities in
Liguria, Lombardy and Veneto. In the province of Caserta, traffickers sold
the drug to mid-level Moroccan distributors, Italians and other Nigerians,
who then cut the drug and sold it to other buyers (Tribunale Napoli 2002).
In the end, the criminal strength of foreign actors involved in drug traf-
ficking in the area of Naples is largely inferior to that of Camorra orga-
nizations. While the latter maintain substantial control of large trafficking
operations and, in most cases, street dealing, foreigners – even some small
workers operating in virtual autonomy – tend to occupy very restricted
15 Interview with a prosecutor from the Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, Naples, 18
February 2003.
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market areas. Furthermore, they have neither the size, nor the political,
economic or criminal resources of indigenous clans.
CONCLUSION: CRIMINAL SUCCESSION OR FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIZATION?
At the beginning of the paper, we asked whether or not the emphasis placed
by law enforcement agencies and the Italian media over the last few years
on foreign organized crime might be the prelude to actual ethnic succession
within the Italian drug trade or if, on the contrary, the increasing involve-
ment of foreigners should be seen more as functional and substantially
secondary with respect to the much more frightening indigenous Mafia-
type organizations already existing in Italy.
The analysis of the drug trade has allowed us to consider both hypotheses
and identify a series of relevant characteristics.
In areas with a traditional Mafia presence such as Naples, Italian and
foreign criminal actors involved in high-level trafficking are clearly dis-
tinguished in terms of operational abilities and the extension of criminal
networks available to both groups. While in Naples the Camorra clans hold
positions of absolute power, leaving small areas of autonomy to foreign
criminal groups, other cities such as Milan and Florence show a progres-
sive predominance of foreigners. The incisiveness of law enforcement op-
erations in the Milan area has de facto offered new criminal opportunities
to the latter. In Florence, on the other hand, the absence of competitors
from Mafia crime families has significantly facilitated the inclusion of new
actors in the local market. In both cities, several foreign criminal groups
hold important positions in the international drug trade, often supplying
Mafia groups and potentially negotiating with them on an equal footing.
Nevertheless, the shift from Italians to foreigners has not progressed ho-
mogeneously across Italy, but is affected by the presence or absence of
local criminal organizations capable of exercising pervasive forms of con-
trol over the local context. In southern Italy, Mafia-type organizations hold
top positions in the market while in various areas of central and northern
Italy foreign trafficking groups manage the drug supply with substantial
autonomy (CSM 2001).
Street-level dealing has seen significant addition of foreign elements
that have progressively taken over sales points once occupied by Italians.
Nevertheless, the lower positions of the distribution chain have experienced
only a partial substitution process as sales methods, especially for Italian
dealers, have significantly changed compared to methods used in the past.
Italian retailers seldom go to typical sales points and usually prefer to sup-
ply a fixed clientele. Although less profitable, this method involves less risk
of being intercepted by law enforcement. On this point, the considerable
involvement of foreigners in drug-related crimes suggested by criminal
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statistics only partially reflects a phenomenon of shifting from Italians to
foreigners in the lower positions of the distribution network. What is most
interesting is that a sort of “ethnic stratification” seems possible, related
to positions occupied within the drug trade. While immigrants from North
African countries are involved to a great extent in street-level distribution,
other national groups show comparatively higher numbers in drug traffick-
ing. We could say that “illegal opportunities” are distributed differently, in
terms of criminal careers and chances for higher profits, in relation to the
position each criminal actor holds in the market (Cloward and Ohlin 1960).
These different positions respond in large part to criminal opportunities
revolving around relationships linked to the circle of ethnic origin. Nev-
ertheless, the ethno-linguistic characteristics of the criminal actors alone
neither tell us very much, nor adequately help to explain the different
distribution of illegal opportunities. There is a risk here of falling into
tautological-type explanations that would be of little help in showing why
a certain correspondence exists between national origin and positions held
within the market of criminal actors. In other words, why do North Africans
tend to occupy lower levels in the sales network while Albanians show a
strong inclination toward top positions in the distribution structure? Factors
influencing this should be sought in the organizational capacity shown by
the criminal groups, the type of relationships existing within their group
and, finally, the willingness to resort to particular methods such as violence.
In analysing the judicial material gathered, the existence frequently
emerges among members of Albanian criminal groups of kinship bonds
or relationships based on common territorial origin; these often involve
brothers, cousins or friends who either met in Albania and decided to
immigrate together or met subsequently in Italy. The existence of bonds
beyond mere business relationships gives them access to extra-criminal re-
sources that give rise to special forms of internal cohesion. Considering that
trust is an extremely rare commodity in the illegal business environment,
the ability to count on common bonds reinforced over time helps compen-
sate for the problem of intrinsic insecurity that governs the underworld.
One example of the importance of family ties comes from organizations in
the ‘Ndrangheta that survived unscathed from a period when many Mafia
members became witnesses for the state. According to one prosecutor in the
Judicial District of Reggio Calabria for 15 years, only one high-level mem-
ber of the local cosche ever decided to collaborate with the courts.16 The
assignment of command positions based on kinship or marriages between
Mafia families makes it extremely difficult for prosecutors to identify the
top bosses of Calabrian organizations. If collaborating with the authorities
16 Interview with a prosecutor from the Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, Reggio
Calabria, 27 March 2003.
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means accusing brothers, fathers and nephews, this type of choice meets
with great resistance. One element supporting this is the number of former
members who decided to collaborate with judicial authorities: from 1995
to the first quarter of 1999, 1928 collaborators belonged to the Cosa Nostra,
1014 to the Camorra and just 772 to the ‘Ndrangheta (Vigna 2000). Because
of their large network of contacts abroad and the fact that their top manage-
ment are very protected from law enforcement operations, the ‘Ndrangheta
has currently reached a position of supremacy in international drug traf-
ficking. Recent investigations have in fact determined the Calabrian cosche
actually supply drugs to the Cosa Nostra (DIA 2002, p. 36).
The second element capable of explaining the important position Al-
banian groups have reached compared to other foreign competitors on the
illegal market involves the organizational aspect. Although they have less
organizational ability than Mafia-type associations, they act according to a
group logic, are internally organized by type of function and tend to create
alliances with other organizations composed of their fellow countrymen
both in Italy and Albania.17 Above all, their systematic recourse to vio-
lence seems to be important as the main means of resolving controversies
with other Albanians or competitors. A certain propensity to solve con-
flicts through the use of violence and the availability of a steady supply of
weapons and explosives from the Balkan area make these groups one of
the most feared foreign criminal actors presently operating in Italy.
However, foreign criminal groups are much less able than indigenous
Mafia associations to establish fixed roots in Italy. Although some foreign
groups manage significant criminal and economic resources, they still lack
the capacity to establish close relationships with the legal sphere of society.
For the moment, foreign organizations are far from displaying “political”
resources such as connections with corrupt police officers, entrepreneurs
or the use of bank directors to launder illegal proceeds. By contrast, as
judicial files show, indigenous criminal groups involved in drug trafficking
do have connections with individuals from the legal sphere. Foreigners still
must refer to Italian distributors who provide them with secondary services
such as making places available to stash drugs or acting as front men to
rent apartments under their name that are actually occupied by foreign
traffickers. From this point of view, foreign actors involved in the drug
trade are particularly vulnerable to law enforcement activities, much more
so than Mafia organizations who instead have broad access to contacts
in the legal sphere. Access to this type of resource likely constitutes the
essential condition that allows indigenous criminal associations to endure
over time, enjoy a certain social consent in the territory where they are
established and minimize damage from law enforcement operations.
17Interview with a member of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Florence, 4 June 2003.
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In conclusion, whether or not any of the foreign criminal groups
presently operating in Italy are able to make a big enough breakthrough to
considerably threaten the criminal hegemony of Mafia organizations in the
future remains to be seen. If this were to happen, illegal profits from the
most profitable markets, such as drug trafficking, would constitute a sort of
springboard toward inclusion in the more general economic and social fab-
ric (as happened with the American Cosa Nostra during Prohibition). At that
point, the effects of such “integration” would probably be double-edged
and contradictory: on the one hand, we could have more dangerous and
well-established foreign criminal groups than those operating at present;
on the other, a process might occur, especially for younger generations,
of gradually leaving illegal activities through a mechanism of social pro-
motion via legitimately accepted means. From this point of view, criminal
activities would no longer constitute, as Daniel Bell said in the 1960s re-
garding American society, the “queer ladder of social mobility” taken on by
immigrant communities subject to discrimination from the broader social
context.
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